A national database of arbitrators is needed
India’s aspiration to become a global hub for international arbitration has become a recurring theme at legal conferences nationwide. However, recent statements during conferences reveal a different reality. An example of this is the Solicitor General’s statement, where he said that the arbitration ecosystem is plagued by issues where one can predict the client and law firm simply by knowing the arbitrator’s name. The system, as Solicitor General frankly acknowledged, faces a deep-seated “integrity crisis.”
Therefore, there is a need to implement reforms in the arbitration system which cater to concerns regarding transparency in the system. Pertinently, we already possess the legislative framework to address some of the concerns. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 envisaged the creation of the Arbitration Council of India (ACI), to grade arbitral institutions and accredit arbitrators. The intent was to ensure that appointments reflect demonstrable merit rather than professional familiarity.
However, the promise of 2019 remains unfulfilled. While provisions are notified, the ACI remains nonfunctional. This is not a procedural delay but a substantive failure of reform where the statutory framework exists on paper, but the institutional machinery remains unbuilt. A National Arbitrator Database (NAD) is needed to introduce transparency in the system through the use of technology. The NAD must be a nationwide database which should function as a mandatory, transparent, and unified digital platform of arbitrators. Every active arbitrator in India would require registration on the NAD, with comprehensive profiles including their educational qualifications, domain expertise, years of experience, number of awards rendered and, most importantly, the track record of those awards in judicial challenges. This data would be publicly accessible.
Algorithmic Allocation
For appointment during institutional or court appointed arbitrations, the system would employ algorithmic allocation which would eliminate human discretion. Parties or courts would define required competencies through standardised parameters, for example, “construction disputes” “more than 25 years experience”, and the NAD’s algorithm would generate a randomised, skill-matched shortlist of arbitrators as a choice to the parties.
The parties appointing the arbitrator would select from this system generated list. This shall preserve party autonomy while simultaneously constraining the choice to objectively qualified professionals.
However, to prevent parties from manipulating this system by imposing overly narrow criteria designed to favour a particular arbitrator, the NAD would incorporate safeguards. If search parameters yield fewer than a minimum threshold of arbitrators (example, five qualified arbitrators), the system would automatically broaden the criteria and notify the parties that their specifications were too restrictive. Additionally, the NAD would flag suspicious patterns such as criteria combinations that repeatedly yield the same arbitrator for review by an over-sight authority. This would ensure that algorithmic selection serves genuine matching rather than becoming a backdoor to predetermined appointments. The NAD would also incorporate continuous monitoring mechanisms. Every concluded arbitration would require outcome reporting which means that there will be a record of whether the award was challenged, the grounds of challenge, and the judicial outcome.
This will create a transparent performance record for each arbitrator and will allow parties to make informed decisions and enable the system to identify patterns of concern. An arbitrator whose awards are consistently set aside would see their grading reflect in a pattern, and those who will consistently deliver sound awards would see their professional standing enhanced through measurable metrics.
